Abstract
We study a sample of Form 13F filings where fund advisors seek confidential treatment for some or all of their 13(f)-reportable positions. Consistent with the hypothesis that managers seek confidentiality to protect proprietary information, we find that confidential positions earn positive and significant abnormal returns over the post-filing confidential period. We also find that managers are more likely to seek confidential treatment of illiquid positions that are more susceptible to front-running. Overall, our analysis highlights important benefits of reduced disclosure that are relevant to the current policy debate on hedge fund transparency.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 1499-1518 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis |
Volume | 48 |
Issue number | 5 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Oct 2013 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Accounting
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics