Why do hedge funds avoid disclosure? Evidence from confidential 13F filings

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34 Scopus citations


We study a sample of Form 13F filings where fund advisors seek confidential treatment for some or all of their 13(f)-reportable positions. Consistent with the hypothesis that managers seek confidentiality to protect proprietary information, we find that confidential positions earn positive and significant abnormal returns over the post-filing confidential period. We also find that managers are more likely to seek confidential treatment of illiquid positions that are more susceptible to front-running. Overall, our analysis highlights important benefits of reduced disclosure that are relevant to the current policy debate on hedge fund transparency.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1499-1518
Number of pages20
JournalJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Issue number5
StatePublished - Oct 2013

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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