Unemployment insurance fraud and optimal monitoring

David L. Fuller, B. Ravikumar, Yuzhe Zhang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

An important incentive problem for the design of unemployment insurance is the fraudulent collection of unemployment benefits by workers who are gainfully employed. We show how to efficiently use a combination of tax/subsidy and monitoring to prevent such fraud. The optimal policy monitors the unemployed at fixed intervals. Employment tax is nonmonotonic: it increases between verifications but decreases after a verification. Unemployment benefits are relatively flat between verifications but decrease sharply after a verification. Our quantitative analysis suggests that the optimal monitoring cost is 60 percent of the cost in the current US system. (JEL D82, H24, J64, J65).

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)249-290
Number of pages42
JournalAmerican Economic Journal: Macroeconomics
Volume7
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 2015
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Unemployment insurance
Insurance fraud
Monitoring
Unemployment benefits
Quantitative analysis
Optimal policy
Tax subsidies
Incentives
Costs
Fraud
Workers
Monitoring costs
Tax

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Cite this

Unemployment insurance fraud and optimal monitoring. / Fuller, David L.; Ravikumar, B.; Zhang, Yuzhe.

In: American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2015, p. 249-290.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Fuller, David L. ; Ravikumar, B. ; Zhang, Yuzhe. / Unemployment insurance fraud and optimal monitoring. In: American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics. 2015 ; Vol. 7, No. 2. pp. 249-290.
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