Under-contribution to generic advertising due to self-interested inequity aversion

Jura Liaukonyte, Timothy Richards, Harry M. Kaiser, Bradley J. Rickard

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We modify the behavioural postulate of self-centred inequity aversion to explain producers' reluctance to fund generic fruit and vegetable advertising as a result of experiencing negative utility when others benefit more from a public good than themselves, but positive utility when they earn more than others. We find that higher variability in returns decreases the probability of a favourable vote. Conversely, if information about payoffs is incomplete, if subjects are allowed to experience a trial run of a generic advertising programme, if returns are equal across producers, or if there is government support for the programme, the likelihood of approval rises.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)473-497
Number of pages25
JournalEuropean Review of Agricultural Economics
Volume42
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 2015

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generic advertising
Government Programs
Financial Management
Vegetables
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vegetables
fruits
Generic advertising
Inequity aversion

Keywords

  • Experimental economics
  • Generic advertising
  • Inequity aversion

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Agricultural and Biological Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Under-contribution to generic advertising due to self-interested inequity aversion. / Liaukonyte, Jura; Richards, Timothy; Kaiser, Harry M.; Rickard, Bradley J.

In: European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2015, p. 473-497.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Liaukonyte, Jura ; Richards, Timothy ; Kaiser, Harry M. ; Rickard, Bradley J. / Under-contribution to generic advertising due to self-interested inequity aversion. In: European Review of Agricultural Economics. 2015 ; Vol. 42, No. 3. pp. 473-497.
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