TY - GEN
T1 - Truthful incentive mechanisms for k-anonymity location privacy
AU - Yang, Dejun
AU - Fang, Xi
AU - Xue, Guoliang
PY - 2013
Y1 - 2013
N2 - Tremendous efforts have been made to protect the location privacy of mobile users. Some of them, e.g., k-anonymity, require the participation of multiple mobile users to impede the adversary from tracing. These participating mobile users constitute an anonymity set. However, not all mobile users are seriously concerned about their location privacy. Therefore, to achieve k-anonymity, we need to provide incentives for mobile users to participate in the anonymity set. In this paper, we study the problem of incentive mechanism design for k-anonymity location privacy. We first consider the case where all mobile users have the same privacy degree requirement. We then study the case where the requirements are different. Finally, we consider a more challenging case where mobile users can cheat about not only their valuations but also their requirements. We design an auction-based incentive mechanism for each of these cases and prove that all the auctions are computational efficient, individually rational, budget-balanced, and truthful. We evaluate the performance of different auctions through extensive simulations.
AB - Tremendous efforts have been made to protect the location privacy of mobile users. Some of them, e.g., k-anonymity, require the participation of multiple mobile users to impede the adversary from tracing. These participating mobile users constitute an anonymity set. However, not all mobile users are seriously concerned about their location privacy. Therefore, to achieve k-anonymity, we need to provide incentives for mobile users to participate in the anonymity set. In this paper, we study the problem of incentive mechanism design for k-anonymity location privacy. We first consider the case where all mobile users have the same privacy degree requirement. We then study the case where the requirements are different. Finally, we consider a more challenging case where mobile users can cheat about not only their valuations but also their requirements. We design an auction-based incentive mechanism for each of these cases and prove that all the auctions are computational efficient, individually rational, budget-balanced, and truthful. We evaluate the performance of different auctions through extensive simulations.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84883072323&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84883072323&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/INFCOM.2013.6567111
DO - 10.1109/INFCOM.2013.6567111
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84883072323
SN - 9781467359467
T3 - Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM
SP - 2994
EP - 3002
BT - 2013 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM 2013
T2 - 32nd IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, IEEE INFOCOM 2013
Y2 - 14 April 2013 through 19 April 2013
ER -