Truthful incentive mechanisms for k-anonymity location privacy

Dejun Yang, Xi Fang, Guoliang Xue

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

73 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Tremendous efforts have been made to protect the location privacy of mobile users. Some of them, e.g., k-anonymity, require the participation of multiple mobile users to impede the adversary from tracing. These participating mobile users constitute an anonymity set. However, not all mobile users are seriously concerned about their location privacy. Therefore, to achieve k-anonymity, we need to provide incentives for mobile users to participate in the anonymity set. In this paper, we study the problem of incentive mechanism design for k-anonymity location privacy. We first consider the case where all mobile users have the same privacy degree requirement. We then study the case where the requirements are different. Finally, we consider a more challenging case where mobile users can cheat about not only their valuations but also their requirements. We design an auction-based incentive mechanism for each of these cases and prove that all the auctions are computational efficient, individually rational, budget-balanced, and truthful. We evaluate the performance of different auctions through extensive simulations.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings - IEEE INFOCOM
Pages2994-3002
Number of pages9
DOIs
StatePublished - 2013
Event32nd IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, IEEE INFOCOM 2013 - Turin, Italy
Duration: Apr 14 2013Apr 19 2013

Other

Other32nd IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, IEEE INFOCOM 2013
CountryItaly
CityTurin
Period4/14/134/19/13

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Yang, D., Fang, X., & Xue, G. (2013). Truthful incentive mechanisms for k-anonymity location privacy. In Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM (pp. 2994-3002). [6567111] https://doi.org/10.1109/INFCOM.2013.6567111

Truthful incentive mechanisms for k-anonymity location privacy. / Yang, Dejun; Fang, Xi; Xue, Guoliang.

Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM. 2013. p. 2994-3002 6567111.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Yang, D, Fang, X & Xue, G 2013, Truthful incentive mechanisms for k-anonymity location privacy. in Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM., 6567111, pp. 2994-3002, 32nd IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, IEEE INFOCOM 2013, Turin, Italy, 4/14/13. https://doi.org/10.1109/INFCOM.2013.6567111
Yang D, Fang X, Xue G. Truthful incentive mechanisms for k-anonymity location privacy. In Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM. 2013. p. 2994-3002. 6567111 https://doi.org/10.1109/INFCOM.2013.6567111
Yang, Dejun ; Fang, Xi ; Xue, Guoliang. / Truthful incentive mechanisms for k-anonymity location privacy. Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM. 2013. pp. 2994-3002
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