Truthful auction for cooperative communications

Dejun Yang, Xi Fang, Guoliang Xue

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

69 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

On one hand, cooperative communication has been gaining more and more popularity since it has great potential to increase the capacity of wireless networks. On the other hand, the applications of cooperative communication technology are rarely seen in reality, even in some scenarios where the demands for bandwidth-hungry applications have pushed the system designers to develop innovative network solutions. A main obstacle lying between the potential capability of channel capacity improvement and the wide adoption of cooperative communication is the lack of incentives for the participating wireless nodes to serve as relay nodes. Hence, in this paper, we design TASC, an auction scheme for the cooperative communications, where wireless node can trade relay services. TASC makes an important contribution of maintaining truthfulness while fulfilling other design objectives. We show analytically that TASC is truthful and has polynomial time complexity. Extensive experiments show that TASC can achieve multiple economic properties without significant performance degradation compared with pure relay assignment algorithms.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHoc)
DOIs
StatePublished - 2011
Event12th ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing, MobiHoc'11 - Paris, France
Duration: May 17 2011May 19 2011

Other

Other12th ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing, MobiHoc'11
CountryFrance
CityParis
Period5/17/115/19/11

Fingerprint

Cooperative communication
Channel capacity
Wireless networks
Polynomials
Bandwidth
Degradation
Economics
Experiments

Keywords

  • Cooperative communication auctions
  • Scheme design

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Hardware and Architecture
  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Software

Cite this

Yang, D., Fang, X., & Xue, G. (2011). Truthful auction for cooperative communications. In Proceedings of the International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHoc) [9] https://doi.org/10.1145/2107502.2107514

Truthful auction for cooperative communications. / Yang, Dejun; Fang, Xi; Xue, Guoliang.

Proceedings of the International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHoc). 2011. 9.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Yang, D, Fang, X & Xue, G 2011, Truthful auction for cooperative communications. in Proceedings of the International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHoc)., 9, 12th ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing, MobiHoc'11, Paris, France, 5/17/11. https://doi.org/10.1145/2107502.2107514
Yang D, Fang X, Xue G. Truthful auction for cooperative communications. In Proceedings of the International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHoc). 2011. 9 https://doi.org/10.1145/2107502.2107514
Yang, Dejun ; Fang, Xi ; Xue, Guoliang. / Truthful auction for cooperative communications. Proceedings of the International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHoc). 2011.
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