TY - JOUR
T1 - The poverty of embodied cognition
AU - Goldinger, Stephen
AU - Papesh, Megan H.
AU - Barnhart, Anthony S.
AU - Hansen, Whitney A.
AU - Hout, Michael C.
N1 - Funding Information:
This work was supported by provided by NIH / NICHD grant R01 HD075800-02. We thank John Wixted, Erik Reichle, and Mark Seidenberg for valuable conversations during the development of this article.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2015, Psychonomic Society, Inc.
PY - 2016/8/1
Y1 - 2016/8/1
N2 - In recent years, there has been rapidly growing interest in embodied cognition, a multifaceted theoretical proposition that (1) cognitive processes are influenced by the body, (2) cognition exists in the service of action, (3) cognition is situated in the environment, and (4) cognition may occur without internal representations. Many proponents view embodied cognition as the next great paradigm shift for cognitive science. In this article, we critically examine the core ideas from embodied cognition, taking a “thought exercise” approach. We first note that the basic principles from embodiment theory are either unacceptably vague (e.g., the premise that perception is influenced by the body) or they offer nothing new (e.g., cognition evolved to optimize survival, emotions affect cognition, perception–action couplings are important). We next suggest that, for the vast majority of classic findings in cognitive science, embodied cognition offers no scientifically valuable insight. In most cases, the theory has no logical connections to the phenomena, other than some trivially true ideas. Beyond classic laboratory findings, embodiment theory is also unable to adequately address the basic experiences of cognitive life.
AB - In recent years, there has been rapidly growing interest in embodied cognition, a multifaceted theoretical proposition that (1) cognitive processes are influenced by the body, (2) cognition exists in the service of action, (3) cognition is situated in the environment, and (4) cognition may occur without internal representations. Many proponents view embodied cognition as the next great paradigm shift for cognitive science. In this article, we critically examine the core ideas from embodied cognition, taking a “thought exercise” approach. We first note that the basic principles from embodiment theory are either unacceptably vague (e.g., the premise that perception is influenced by the body) or they offer nothing new (e.g., cognition evolved to optimize survival, emotions affect cognition, perception–action couplings are important). We next suggest that, for the vast majority of classic findings in cognitive science, embodied cognition offers no scientifically valuable insight. In most cases, the theory has no logical connections to the phenomena, other than some trivially true ideas. Beyond classic laboratory findings, embodiment theory is also unable to adequately address the basic experiences of cognitive life.
KW - Embodied cognition
KW - Higher-order cognition
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U2 - 10.3758/s13423-015-0860-1
DO - 10.3758/s13423-015-0860-1
M3 - Article
C2 - 27282990
AN - SCOPUS:84973647720
SN - 1069-9384
VL - 23
SP - 959
EP - 978
JO - Psychonomic Bulletin and Review
JF - Psychonomic Bulletin and Review
IS - 4
ER -