The effect of subsistence on collapse and institutional adaptation in population-resource societies

John C V Pezzey, John Anderies

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

26 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We extend the Brander-Taylor model of population and resource development in an isolated society by adding a resource subsistence requirement to people's preferences. This improves plausibility; amplifies population overshoot and collapse, and can destabilize the steady state; and allows for complete cessation of non-harvesting activities, in line with archaeological evidence for many societies. We then use bifurcation techniques to give a global analysis of four types of institutional adaptation: An ad valorem resource tax, and quotas on total resource harvest, total harvest effort and per capita effort. In all cases, we find that a higher subsistence requirement makes it harder, or often impossible, for adaptation to avoid overshoot and collapse.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)299-320
Number of pages22
JournalJournal of Development Economics
Volume72
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 2003

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subsistence
resource
society
resources
archaeological evidence
resource development
bifurcation
taxes
effect
Subsistence
Resources
evidence
harvest
Overshoot
Harvest

Keywords

  • Bifurcation
  • Conservation
  • Population
  • Renewable resources
  • Subsistence

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

The effect of subsistence on collapse and institutional adaptation in population-resource societies. / Pezzey, John C V; Anderies, John.

In: Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 72, No. 1, 10.2003, p. 299-320.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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