The dark side of individual blockholder philanthropy

Thomas D. Shohfi, Roger M. White

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We examine the market reaction to charitable pledges by individual blockholders of public firms. As this philanthropy may signal a weakening preference for wealth maximization and may be indicative of distraction or relaxed monitoring, these agency costs may overwhelm any reputation benefits. We find decreased firm value and lower pay-for-performance sensitivity, the effects of which are most severe where monitoring needs are high, the blockholder is a director, or when the firm has ex ante high corporate social responsibility ratings. Our results are robust to controlling for prior charitable foundation involvement, busy director–blockholders, dual-class share structures, blockholder exit, and pre-pledge firm sentiment.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalFinancial Management
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - Jan 1 2019

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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