The core as a solution to exclusionary networks

Elisa Bienenstock, Phillip Bonacich

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

94 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The core is a game theory solution concept that is applicable to exclusionary (negatively connected) exchange networks. The core makes only the minimal assumptions of individual and coalitional rationality. The core describes who should exchange with whom and what the terms of the exchanges should be. Unlike other algorithms that have been applied to exclusionary exchange networks, the core applies to a wider variety of problems than any single competing procedure previously proposed. It can easily be extended to handle a variety of situations: more than one exchange per round; relationships having unequal values; positions having sources of reward other than exchange; and situations where more than one exchange is required. Moreover, networks in which the core is empty should experience particular difficulty in reaching agreement about exchanges.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)231-243
Number of pages13
JournalSocial Networks
Volume14
Issue number3-4
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1992
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Game Theory
Reward
game theory
rationality
reward
Values
experience

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Anthropology
  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Psychology(all)

Cite this

The core as a solution to exclusionary networks. / Bienenstock, Elisa; Bonacich, Phillip.

In: Social Networks, Vol. 14, No. 3-4, 01.01.1992, p. 231-243.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Bienenstock, Elisa ; Bonacich, Phillip. / The core as a solution to exclusionary networks. In: Social Networks. 1992 ; Vol. 14, No. 3-4. pp. 231-243.
@article{601b1a1110d84e668ba8c616458d7216,
title = "The core as a solution to exclusionary networks",
abstract = "The core is a game theory solution concept that is applicable to exclusionary (negatively connected) exchange networks. The core makes only the minimal assumptions of individual and coalitional rationality. The core describes who should exchange with whom and what the terms of the exchanges should be. Unlike other algorithms that have been applied to exclusionary exchange networks, the core applies to a wider variety of problems than any single competing procedure previously proposed. It can easily be extended to handle a variety of situations: more than one exchange per round; relationships having unequal values; positions having sources of reward other than exchange; and situations where more than one exchange is required. Moreover, networks in which the core is empty should experience particular difficulty in reaching agreement about exchanges.",
author = "Elisa Bienenstock and Phillip Bonacich",
year = "1992",
month = "1",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/0378-8733(92)90003-P",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "14",
pages = "231--243",
journal = "Social Networks",
issn = "0378-8733",
publisher = "Elsevier BV",
number = "3-4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - The core as a solution to exclusionary networks

AU - Bienenstock, Elisa

AU - Bonacich, Phillip

PY - 1992/1/1

Y1 - 1992/1/1

N2 - The core is a game theory solution concept that is applicable to exclusionary (negatively connected) exchange networks. The core makes only the minimal assumptions of individual and coalitional rationality. The core describes who should exchange with whom and what the terms of the exchanges should be. Unlike other algorithms that have been applied to exclusionary exchange networks, the core applies to a wider variety of problems than any single competing procedure previously proposed. It can easily be extended to handle a variety of situations: more than one exchange per round; relationships having unequal values; positions having sources of reward other than exchange; and situations where more than one exchange is required. Moreover, networks in which the core is empty should experience particular difficulty in reaching agreement about exchanges.

AB - The core is a game theory solution concept that is applicable to exclusionary (negatively connected) exchange networks. The core makes only the minimal assumptions of individual and coalitional rationality. The core describes who should exchange with whom and what the terms of the exchanges should be. Unlike other algorithms that have been applied to exclusionary exchange networks, the core applies to a wider variety of problems than any single competing procedure previously proposed. It can easily be extended to handle a variety of situations: more than one exchange per round; relationships having unequal values; positions having sources of reward other than exchange; and situations where more than one exchange is required. Moreover, networks in which the core is empty should experience particular difficulty in reaching agreement about exchanges.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0001647727&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0001647727&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/0378-8733(92)90003-P

DO - 10.1016/0378-8733(92)90003-P

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0001647727

VL - 14

SP - 231

EP - 243

JO - Social Networks

JF - Social Networks

SN - 0378-8733

IS - 3-4

ER -