Secrecy and Self-Interest: When Mediators Act Deceitfully

Babak RezaeeDaryakenari, Cameron Thies

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

3rd party intervention in interstate conflict is a common strategy for mitigating conflict and obtaining a final agreement. However, not all mediations are successful, leading to the development of a rich literature on the mechanisms which decrease the probability of failure in a 3rd-party intervention. Within this literature, some studies examine how a mediator’ behavior and incentives affect the result of the mediation. Virtually all these studies assume that the mediator is virtuous such that peace is the most desired outcome of a conflict for her. However, this study challenges this assumption and contends that a mediator can gain benefit from the conflict between disputants. If this benefit is adequately large to overcome the benefits of peace, then the mediator has enough incentive not to conduct the mediation toward a peaceful outcome. We develop a signaling game model to study this issue formally and test the proposed hypothesis empirically.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-28
Number of pages28
JournalInternational Interactions
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - Dec 20 2017

Fingerprint

secrecy
act
mediation
peace
incentive
literature

Keywords

  • International conflict
  • international mediation
  • private information
  • private interest

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Political Science and International Relations

Cite this

Secrecy and Self-Interest : When Mediators Act Deceitfully. / RezaeeDaryakenari, Babak; Thies, Cameron.

In: International Interactions, 20.12.2017, p. 1-28.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{c1c545806d584d3cbd5925688a8d772d,
title = "Secrecy and Self-Interest: When Mediators Act Deceitfully",
abstract = "3rd party intervention in interstate conflict is a common strategy for mitigating conflict and obtaining a final agreement. However, not all mediations are successful, leading to the development of a rich literature on the mechanisms which decrease the probability of failure in a 3rd-party intervention. Within this literature, some studies examine how a mediator’ behavior and incentives affect the result of the mediation. Virtually all these studies assume that the mediator is virtuous such that peace is the most desired outcome of a conflict for her. However, this study challenges this assumption and contends that a mediator can gain benefit from the conflict between disputants. If this benefit is adequately large to overcome the benefits of peace, then the mediator has enough incentive not to conduct the mediation toward a peaceful outcome. We develop a signaling game model to study this issue formally and test the proposed hypothesis empirically.",
keywords = "International conflict, international mediation, private information, private interest",
author = "Babak RezaeeDaryakenari and Cameron Thies",
year = "2017",
month = "12",
day = "20",
doi = "10.1080/03050629.2018.1406931",
language = "English (US)",
pages = "1--28",
journal = "International Interactions",
issn = "0305-0629",
publisher = "Taylor and Francis Ltd.",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Secrecy and Self-Interest

T2 - When Mediators Act Deceitfully

AU - RezaeeDaryakenari, Babak

AU - Thies, Cameron

PY - 2017/12/20

Y1 - 2017/12/20

N2 - 3rd party intervention in interstate conflict is a common strategy for mitigating conflict and obtaining a final agreement. However, not all mediations are successful, leading to the development of a rich literature on the mechanisms which decrease the probability of failure in a 3rd-party intervention. Within this literature, some studies examine how a mediator’ behavior and incentives affect the result of the mediation. Virtually all these studies assume that the mediator is virtuous such that peace is the most desired outcome of a conflict for her. However, this study challenges this assumption and contends that a mediator can gain benefit from the conflict between disputants. If this benefit is adequately large to overcome the benefits of peace, then the mediator has enough incentive not to conduct the mediation toward a peaceful outcome. We develop a signaling game model to study this issue formally and test the proposed hypothesis empirically.

AB - 3rd party intervention in interstate conflict is a common strategy for mitigating conflict and obtaining a final agreement. However, not all mediations are successful, leading to the development of a rich literature on the mechanisms which decrease the probability of failure in a 3rd-party intervention. Within this literature, some studies examine how a mediator’ behavior and incentives affect the result of the mediation. Virtually all these studies assume that the mediator is virtuous such that peace is the most desired outcome of a conflict for her. However, this study challenges this assumption and contends that a mediator can gain benefit from the conflict between disputants. If this benefit is adequately large to overcome the benefits of peace, then the mediator has enough incentive not to conduct the mediation toward a peaceful outcome. We develop a signaling game model to study this issue formally and test the proposed hypothesis empirically.

KW - International conflict

KW - international mediation

KW - private information

KW - private interest

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85038399221&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85038399221&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1080/03050629.2018.1406931

DO - 10.1080/03050629.2018.1406931

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85038399221

SP - 1

EP - 28

JO - International Interactions

JF - International Interactions

SN - 0305-0629

ER -