Rawls and feminism: What should feminists make of liberal neutrality?

Elizabeth Brake

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

14 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

I argue that Rawls's liberalism is compatible with feminist goals. I focus primarily on the issue of liberal neutrality, a topic suggested by the work of Catharine MacKinnon. I discuss two kinds of neutrality: neutrality at the level of justifying liberalism itself, and state neutrality in political decision-making. Both kinds are contentious within liberal theory. Rawls's argument for justice as fairness has been criticized for non-neutrality at the justificatory level, a problem noted by Rawls himself in Political Liberalism. I will defend a qualified account of neutrality at the justificatory level, taking an epistemic approach to argue for the exclusion of certain doctrines from the justificatory process. I then argue that the justification process I describe offers a justificatory stance supportive of the feminist rejection of state-sponsored gender hierarchy. Further, I argue that liberal neutrality at the level of political decision-making will have surprising implications for gender equality. Once the extent of the state's involvement in the apparently private spheres of family and civil society is recognized, and the disproportionate influence of a sexist conception of the good on those structures - and concomitant promotion of that ideal - is seen, state neutrality implies substantive change. While - as Susan Moller Okin avowed - Rawls himself may have remained ambiguous on how to address gender inequality, his theory implies that the state must seek to create substantive, not merely formal, equality. I suggest that those substantive changes will not conflict with liberal neutrality but instead be required by it.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)293-309
Number of pages17
JournalJournal of Moral Philosophy
Volume1
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 2004
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Neutrality
Feminism
Liberal Neutrality
Decision Making
Liberalism
Justification
Stance
Political Liberalism
Conception
Civil Society
Equality
Justice as Fairness
Rejection
Private Sphere
Ideal
Exclusion
Doctrine
Gender Inequality
Gender Equality

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Rawls and feminism : What should feminists make of liberal neutrality? / Brake, Elizabeth.

In: Journal of Moral Philosophy, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2004, p. 293-309.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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