TY - GEN
T1 - RASSS
T2 - 13th IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems, DFT 2017
AU - Bu, Lake
AU - Nguyen, Hien D.
AU - Kinsy, Michel A.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 IEEE.
PY - 2017/6/28
Y1 - 2017/6/28
N2 - Robust Adaptive Secure Secret Sharing (RASSS) is a protocol for reconstructing secrets and information in distributed computing systems even in the presence of a large number of untrusted participants. Since the original Shamir's Secret Sharing scheme, there have been efforts to secure the technique against dishonest shareholders. Early on, researchers determined that the Reed-Solomon encoding property of the Shamir's share distribution equation and its decoding algorithm could tolerate cheaters up to one third of the total shareholders. However, if the number of cheaters grows beyond the error correcting capability (distance) of the Reed-Solomon codes, the reconstruction of the secret is hindered. Untrusted participants or cheaters could hide in the decoding procedure, or even frame up the honest parties. In this paper, we solve this challenge and propose a secure protocol that is no longer constrained by the limitations of the Reed-Solomon codes. As long as there are a minimum number of honest shareholders, the RASSS protocol is able to identify the cheaters and retrieve the correct secret or information in a distributed system with a probability close to 1 with less than 60% of hardware overhead. Furthermore, the adaptive nature of the protocol enables considerable hardware and timing resource savings and makes RASSS highly practical.
AB - Robust Adaptive Secure Secret Sharing (RASSS) is a protocol for reconstructing secrets and information in distributed computing systems even in the presence of a large number of untrusted participants. Since the original Shamir's Secret Sharing scheme, there have been efforts to secure the technique against dishonest shareholders. Early on, researchers determined that the Reed-Solomon encoding property of the Shamir's share distribution equation and its decoding algorithm could tolerate cheaters up to one third of the total shareholders. However, if the number of cheaters grows beyond the error correcting capability (distance) of the Reed-Solomon codes, the reconstruction of the secret is hindered. Untrusted participants or cheaters could hide in the decoding procedure, or even frame up the honest parties. In this paper, we solve this challenge and propose a secure protocol that is no longer constrained by the limitations of the Reed-Solomon codes. As long as there are a minimum number of honest shareholders, the RASSS protocol is able to identify the cheaters and retrieve the correct secret or information in a distributed system with a probability close to 1 with less than 60% of hardware overhead. Furthermore, the adaptive nature of the protocol enables considerable hardware and timing resource savings and makes RASSS highly practical.
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U2 - 10.1109/DFT.2017.8244432
DO - 10.1109/DFT.2017.8244432
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85046019537
T3 - 2017 IEEE Int. Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems, DFT 2017
SP - 1
EP - 6
BT - 2017 IEEE Int. Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems, DFT 2017
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Y2 - 23 October 2017 through 25 October 2017
ER -