Product innovation and process innovation in a dynamic Stackelberg game

Yufang Wang, Xinyu Wang, Shuhua Chang, Yun Kang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Under a Stackelberg game structure, we investigate the optimal R&D portfolio of a single-product monopolist investment in product and process innovations of a South-country firm. The research is conducted using a dynamic game with knowledge accumulation. The South-country firm is a manufacturer (the Stackelberg leader) with a two-market framework, in which it supplies products for its domestic market and a North-country firm (the Stackelberg follower). Consumers in the two markets have different green preferences and price sensitivities. Two conventional results reveal that: (a) the investment decisions in product and process innovations are complementary; and (b) the optimal investment efforts positively respond to a learning rate and a knowledge accumulation rate. Specifically, we find that: (a) the optimal innovation efforts of the manufacturer are more heavily affected by the green product preferences of the Stackelberg follower than that of itself; and (b) when consumers’ marginal willingness to pay for green products is sufficiently high, optimal investment efforts are higher in the profit-seeking optimum than that in social welfare seeking optimum. In addition, we demonstrate that under both the monopolist optimum and the social optimum, a unique saddle steady-state equilibrium exists.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)395-403
Number of pages9
JournalComputers and Industrial Engineering
Volume130
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1 2019

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Keywords

  • Knowledge accumulation
  • Process innovation
  • Product innovation
  • Stackelberg game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Engineering(all)

Cite this

Product innovation and process innovation in a dynamic Stackelberg game. / Wang, Yufang; Wang, Xinyu; Chang, Shuhua; Kang, Yun.

In: Computers and Industrial Engineering, Vol. 130, 01.04.2019, p. 395-403.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Wang, Yufang ; Wang, Xinyu ; Chang, Shuhua ; Kang, Yun. / Product innovation and process innovation in a dynamic Stackelberg game. In: Computers and Industrial Engineering. 2019 ; Vol. 130. pp. 395-403.
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