Possibilities and limitations to cooperation in small groups: The case of group-owned wells in Southern India

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

34 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This study examines the incidence of collective action for a range of activities associated with the use and management of group-owned wells in India. We find that while activities such as everyday allocation of water and routine maintenance are managed well by almost all sample groups, group members prefer to undertake large-scale investments individually in spite of the advantages of pooling capital and sharing risks. The paper attempts to explain why this is so by looking at the transaction costs associated with these activities. By distinguishing between different activities, the study provides sharper insights into the workings of informal mechanisms of cooperation. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1481-1497
Number of pages17
JournalWorld Development
Volume28
Issue number8
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 2000
Externally publishedYes

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collective action
transaction cost
small group
India
well
Group
water
transaction costs
collective behavior
group membership
incidence
allocation
co-operation
management

Keywords

  • Asia
  • Collective action
  • Common property
  • Groundwater irrigation
  • India
  • Transaction costs

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Development
  • Geography, Planning and Development
  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

Possibilities and limitations to cooperation in small groups : The case of group-owned wells in Southern India. / Aggarwal, Rimjhim.

In: World Development, Vol. 28, No. 8, 08.2000, p. 1481-1497.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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