Pathways to pluralism about biological individuality

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

What are the prospects for a monistic view of biological individuality given the multiple epistemic roles the concept must satisfy? In this paper, I examine the epistemic adequacy of two recent accounts based on the capacity to undergo natural selection. One is from Ellen Clarke, and the other is by Peter Godfrey-Smith. Clarke’s position reflects a strong monism, in that she aims to characterize individuality in purely functional terms and refrains from privileging any specific material properties as important in their own right. I argue that Clarke’s functionalism impairs the epistemic adequacy of her account compared to a middle-ground position taken by Godfrey-Smith. In comparing Clarke and Godfrey-Smith’s account, two pathways emerge to pluralism about biological individuality. The first develops from the contrast between functionalist and materialist approaches, and the second from an underlying temporal structure involved in using evolutionary processes to define individuality.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)609-628
Number of pages20
JournalBiology and Philosophy
Volume30
Issue number5
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1 2015
Externally publishedYes

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multicultural diversity
Cultural Diversity
Individuality
natural selection
Genetic Selection
Pathway
Pluralism
Adequacy

Keywords

  • Evolutionary transitions
  • Fitness
  • Function
  • Group selection
  • Multi-level selection
  • Natural selection

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Agricultural and Biological Sciences(all)
  • History and Philosophy of Science
  • Philosophy

Cite this

Pathways to pluralism about biological individuality. / Sterner, Beckett.

In: Biology and Philosophy, Vol. 30, No. 5, 01.10.2015, p. 609-628.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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