Paradoxical self-deception: Maybe not so paradoxical after all

S. L. Brown, Douglas Kenrick

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The simultaneous possession of conflicting beliefs is both possible and logical within current models of human cognition. Specifically, evidence of lateral inhibition and state-dependent memory suggests a means by which conflicting beliefs can coexist without requiring 'mental exotica'. We suggest that paradoxical self-deception enables the self-deceiver to store important information for use at a later time.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)109-110
Number of pages2
JournalBehavioral and Brain Sciences
Volume20
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 1997

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cognition
Deception
Cognition
Inhibition (Psychology)

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics
  • Neuroscience(all)
  • Psychology(all)
  • Neuropsychology and Physiological Psychology

Cite this

Paradoxical self-deception : Maybe not so paradoxical after all. / Brown, S. L.; Kenrick, Douglas.

In: Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1997, p. 109-110.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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