Paradoxical self-deception: Maybe not so paradoxical after all

S. L. Brown, Douglas Kenrick

Research output: Contribution to journalShort survey

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

The simultaneous possession of conflicting beliefs is both possible and logical within current models of human cognition. Specifically, evidence of lateral inhibition and state-dependent memory suggests a means by which conflicting beliefs can coexist without requiring 'mental exotica'. We suggest that paradoxical self-deception enables the self-deceiver to store important information for use at a later time.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)109-110
Number of pages2
JournalBehavioral and Brain Sciences
Volume20
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1997

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Neuropsychology and Physiological Psychology
  • Physiology
  • Behavioral Neuroscience

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