Abstract
We use agency theory to examine the influence of ownership structure on the relationship between financial slack and R&D investments, highlighting how that relationship might differ depending on the identity of the owners, and their potentially different interests. In doing so, we extend the scope of agency theory by examining the principal-principal conflicts of interests that may exist among different types of owners. Using a sample of Korean manufacturing firms in R&D-intensive industries between 1998 and 2003, we find that financial slack has an inverted U-shaped relationship with R&D investments. Furthermore, that relationship varies depending on the presence of different types of owners. Family ownership positively moderates the relationship between financial slack and R&D investments, whereas domestic institutional investors and foreign investors negatively moderate that relationship. Our results show that distinguishing among different types of owners is instrumental in enhancing our understanding of the nature of the relationship between financial slack and R&D investments.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 404-418 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| Journal | Organization Science |
| Volume | 19 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - May 2008 |
Keywords
- Agency theory
- Organizational slack
- Ownership structure
- R&D investments
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Strategy and Management
- Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
- Management of Technology and Innovation