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Optimal environmental regulation of politically influential sectors with asymmetric information
Glenn Sheriff
Research output
:
Contribution to journal
›
Article
›
peer-review
7
Scopus citations
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Dive into the research topics of 'Optimal environmental regulation of politically influential sectors with asymmetric information'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.
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Business & Economics
Environmental Regulation
59%
Asymmetric Information
55%
Countervailing Incentives
47%
Subsidies
47%
Welfare Policy
42%
Political Constraints
40%
Emission Control
39%
Income Support
39%
Information Advantage
39%
Contract Design
35%
Social Welfare
34%
Government
33%
Firm Productivity
33%
Optimal Policy
27%
Income
27%
Pollution
26%
Earth & Environmental Sciences
asymmetric information
100%
environmental regulation
67%
subsidy
63%
firm
56%
income
51%
social welfare
40%
pollution reduction
39%
policy
35%
environmental consequence
34%
emission control
32%
incentive
28%
contract
28%
price
23%
productivity
20%