On malicious data attacks on power system state estimation

Oliver Kosut, Liyan Jia, Robert J. Thomas, Lang Tong

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

57 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The problem of detecting and characterizing impacts of malicious attacks against smart grid state estimation is considered. Different from the classical bad data detection for state estimation, the detection of malicious data injected by an adversary must take into account carefully designed attacks capable of evading conventional bad data detection. A Bayesian framework is presented for the characterization of fundamental tradeoffs at the control center and for the adversary. For the control center, a detector based on the generalized likelihood ratio test (GRLT) is introduced and compared with conventional bad detection detection schemes. For the adversary, the tradeoff between increasing the mean square error (MSE) of the state estimation vs. the probability of being detected by the control center is characterized. A heuristic is presented for the design of worst attack.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the Universities Power Engineering Conference
StatePublished - 2010
Externally publishedYes
Event2010 45th International Universities' Power Engineering Conference, UPEC 2010 - Cardiff, United Kingdom
Duration: Aug 31 2010Sep 3 2010

Other

Other2010 45th International Universities' Power Engineering Conference, UPEC 2010
CountryUnited Kingdom
CityCardiff
Period8/31/109/3/10

Fingerprint

State estimation
Mean square error
Detectors

Keywords

  • Energy management systems
  • False data attack
  • Smart grid security
  • State estimation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Energy Engineering and Power Technology

Cite this

Kosut, O., Jia, L., Thomas, R. J., & Tong, L. (2010). On malicious data attacks on power system state estimation. In Proceedings of the Universities Power Engineering Conference [5649823]

On malicious data attacks on power system state estimation. / Kosut, Oliver; Jia, Liyan; Thomas, Robert J.; Tong, Lang.

Proceedings of the Universities Power Engineering Conference. 2010. 5649823.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Kosut, O, Jia, L, Thomas, RJ & Tong, L 2010, On malicious data attacks on power system state estimation. in Proceedings of the Universities Power Engineering Conference., 5649823, 2010 45th International Universities' Power Engineering Conference, UPEC 2010, Cardiff, United Kingdom, 8/31/10.
Kosut O, Jia L, Thomas RJ, Tong L. On malicious data attacks on power system state estimation. In Proceedings of the Universities Power Engineering Conference. 2010. 5649823
Kosut, Oliver ; Jia, Liyan ; Thomas, Robert J. ; Tong, Lang. / On malicious data attacks on power system state estimation. Proceedings of the Universities Power Engineering Conference. 2010.
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