TY - JOUR
T1 - Latent classes in exchange networks
T2 - Sets of positions with common interests
AU - Bonacich, Phillip
AU - Bienenstock, Elisa Jayne
N1 - Funding Information:
*The research was funded by National Science Foundation grant SES-9210058. * Corresponding author. 1Other issues have been addressed to a lesser extent: who trades with whom (Markovsky et al., 1988), partitioning networks into smaller subnetworks (Markovsky et al., 1988), and the ability to exercise power without limiting ones own reward (Cook et al., 1986). This paper will address all these issues.
PY - 1997
Y1 - 1997
N2 - While it is known that positions in exchange networks are interdependent, little work has been done to develop a systematic procedure to determine the type and pattern of these interdependencies. Wording from an insight by Shubik (1984), this paper proposes a canonical form for such interdependence. The model does not depend on the existence of pre-existing categories of complementary positions, such as buyers and sellers or men and women. The model uses only network position to create classes of positions with linked fates Simulation and experimental results are presented that support this schema. These findings lay the groundwork for the study of collusion in exchange networks: members of latent classes, who share a common fate, would be likely to form coalitions when free communication exists.
AB - While it is known that positions in exchange networks are interdependent, little work has been done to develop a systematic procedure to determine the type and pattern of these interdependencies. Wording from an insight by Shubik (1984), this paper proposes a canonical form for such interdependence. The model does not depend on the existence of pre-existing categories of complementary positions, such as buyers and sellers or men and women. The model uses only network position to create classes of positions with linked fates Simulation and experimental results are presented that support this schema. These findings lay the groundwork for the study of collusion in exchange networks: members of latent classes, who share a common fate, would be likely to form coalitions when free communication exists.
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U2 - 10.1080/0022250X.1997.9990192
DO - 10.1080/0022250X.1997.9990192
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0031498685
SN - 0022-250X
VL - 22
SP - 1
EP - 28
JO - Journal of Mathematical Sociology
JF - Journal of Mathematical Sociology
IS - 1
ER -