Influencing initial public offering investors with prestige: Signaling with board structures

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

499 Scopus citations

Abstract

I describe how board structures influence the decision-making processes that investors use when purchasing shares of firms undertaking initial public offerings (IPOs). IPO firms are relatively unknown to investors and suffer from a liability of market newness. I rely on signaling theory, institutional theory, and sociological research on prestige to suggest that investor perceptions of board prestige signal organizational legitimacy, thereby reducing the liability of market newness and improving IPO firm stock performance. I also propose that the characteristics of investors, namely prestige, influence their perceptions of board prestige.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)432-446
Number of pages15
JournalAcademy of Management Review
Volume28
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 2003
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Strategy and Management
  • Management of Technology and Innovation

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