Hybrid organizations and the alignment of interests: The case of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

33 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This article explores the political influence of government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Using Congress's overhaul of the regulatory infrastructure for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as a case study, the article presents two principal findings: (1) The characteristics that distinguish government-sponsored enterprises from traditional government agencies and private companies endow Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with unique political resources; and (2) the alignment of interest groups around Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is subject to strategic manipulation by the GSEs. A triangular model of this alignment is proposed and employed to analyze the legislative outcome. The case has implications for students of organizational theory as well as policy makers considering the use of GSEs or other hybrid organizations.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)468-481
Number of pages14
JournalPublic Administration Review
Volume61
Issue number4
StatePublished - Jul 2001
Externally publishedYes

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political influence
government agency
interest group
manipulation
Government sponsored enterprises
Alignment
Fannie Mae
Hybrid organizations
infrastructure
resources
student
Organizational policy
Resources
Government agencies
Political influence
Manipulation
Organizational theory
Interest groups
Politicians
Private companies

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Marketing
  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Public Administration

Cite this

Hybrid organizations and the alignment of interests : The case of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. / Koppell, Jonathan.

In: Public Administration Review, Vol. 61, No. 4, 07.2001, p. 468-481.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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