Fatherhood and child support

Do men have a right to choose?

Elizabeth Brake

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

25 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

My primary aim is to call into question an influential notion of paternal responsibility, namely, that fathers owe support to their children due to their causal responsibility for their existence. I argue that men who impregnate women unintentionally, and despite having taken preventative measures, do not owe child support to their children as a matter of justice; their children have no right against them for support. I argue for this on the basis of plausible principles of responsibility which have been used to defend abortion rights. I then consider the morally relevant differences between men and women, arguing that while in some cases these differences may justify differential treatment, their import should not be overstated — in many cases, the burden of child support will be too great to impose justly on fathers. This conclusion is not as undesirable as it may seem: I suggest feminist considerations in favour of revising the notion of paternal responsibility and consider alternative arrangements of child support.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)55-73
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Applied Philosophy
Volume22
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1 2005
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Fatherhood
Responsibility
Import
Burden
Justice
Arrangement
Abortion
Causal

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Fatherhood and child support : Do men have a right to choose? / Brake, Elizabeth.

In: Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 22, No. 1, 01.03.2005, p. 55-73.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Brake, Elizabeth. / Fatherhood and child support : Do men have a right to choose?. In: Journal of Applied Philosophy. 2005 ; Vol. 22, No. 1. pp. 55-73.
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