Everyone is different: Client-side diversification for defending against extension fingerprinting

Erik Trickel, Oleksii Starov, Alexandros Kapravelos, Nick Nikiforakis, Adam Doupé

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

Browser fingerprinting refers to the extraction of attributes from a user's browser which can be combined into a near-unique fingerprint. These fingerprints can be used to re-identify users without requiring the use of cookies or other stateful identifiers. Browser extensions enhance the client-side browser experience; however, prior work has shown that their website modifications are fingerprintable and can be used to infer sensitive information about users. In this paper we present CloakX, the first client-side anti-fingerprinting countermeasure that works without requiring browser modification or requiring extension developers to modify their code. CloakX uses client-side diversification to prevent extension detection using anchorprints (fingerprints comprised of artifacts directly accessible to any webpage) and to reduce the accuracy of extension detection using structureprints (fingerprints built from an extension's behavior). Despite the complexity of browser extensions, CloakX automatically incorporates client-side diversification into the extensions and maintains equivalent functionality through the use of static and dynamic program analysis. We evaluate the efficacy of CloakX on 18,937 extensions using large-scale automated analysis and in-depth manual testing. We conducted experiments to test the functionality equivalence, the detectability, and the performance of CloakX-enabled extensions. Beyond extension detection, we demonstrate that client-side modification of extensions is a viable method for the late-stage customization of browser extensions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium
PublisherUSENIX Association
Pages1679-1696
Number of pages18
ISBN (Electronic)9781939133069
StatePublished - Jan 1 2019
Event28th USENIX Security Symposium - Santa Clara, United States
Duration: Aug 14 2019Aug 16 2019

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium

Conference

Conference28th USENIX Security Symposium
CountryUnited States
CitySanta Clara
Period8/14/198/16/19

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Information Systems
  • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality

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  • Cite this

    Trickel, E., Starov, O., Kapravelos, A., Nikiforakis, N., & Doupé, A. (2019). Everyone is different: Client-side diversification for defending against extension fingerprinting. In Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium (pp. 1679-1696). (Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium). USENIX Association.