Equilibrium in a two-agent assignment problem

Giovanni Felici, Mariagrazia Mecoli, Pitu B. Mirchandani, Andrea Pacifici

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper we address a particular generalisation of the Assignment Problem (AP) in a Multi-Agent setting, where distributed agents share common resources. We consider the problem of determining Pareto-optimal solutions that satisfy a fairness criterion (equilibrium). We show that the solution obtained is equivalent to a Kalai Smorodinsky solution of a suitably defined bargaining problem and characterise the computational complexity of finding such an equilibrium. Additionally, we propose an exact solution algorithm based on a branch-and-bound scheme that exploits bounds obtained by suitably rounding the solutions of the corresponding linear relaxation, and give the results of extensive computational experiments.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)4-26
Number of pages23
JournalInternational Journal of Operational Research
Volume6
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2009

Keywords

  • Competitive assignment
  • Equilibrium
  • Pareto-optimality

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Management Science and Operations Research

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Equilibrium in a two-agent assignment problem'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this