@article{3bbf8d06bfa143beabdf45fd0d9dfa11,
title = "Do CEOs Affect Employees' Political Choices?",
abstract = "We study the relation between CEO and employee campaign contributions and find that CEO-supported political candidates receive 3 times more money from employees than candidates not supported by the CEO. This relation holds around CEO departures, including plausibly exogenous departures due to retirement or death. Equity returns are significantly higher when CEO-supported candidates win elections than when employee-supported candidates win, suggesting that CEOs' campaign contributions are more aligned with the interests of shareholders than are employee contributions. Finally, employees whose donations are misaligned with their CEOs' political preferences are more likely to leave their employer. Received May 16, 2018; editorial decision April 30, 2019 by Editor David Denis. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix and Data Supplement, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.",
author = "Ilona Babenko and Viktar Fedaseyeu and Song Zhang",
note = "Funding Information: This paper has benefited from helpful comments by David Denis (the Editor), Pat Akey, Benjamin Bennett, Lauren Cohen, Francesco Corielli, Francesco Franzoni, Neal Galpin, Nicola Gennaioli, Erik Gilje, Julien Sauvagnat, Fabiano Schivardi, Rik Sen, Philip Strahan, Yuri Tserlukevich, Hannes Wagner, and Irene Yi; two anonymous referees; seminar participants at Arizona State University, Bocconi University, Cambridge University, the University of New South Wales, the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and the University of Warwick; and participants at the 2017 Finance Down Under Conference, 2018 NFA Meetings, 2018 Mitsui Finance Symposium, and the 25th NES Conference. We thank the BAFFI CAREFIN Center at Bocconi University for financial support; the center played no role in study design, data collection, and analysis or preparation of the manuscript. Send correspondence to Viktar Fedaseyeu, Bocconi University, Via Rontgen 1, Milan, 20136. E-mail: viktar.fedaseyeu@unibocconi.it. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2019 The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.",
year = "2020",
month = apr,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1093/rfs/hhz080",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "33",
pages = "1781--1817",
journal = "Review of Financial Studies",
issn = "0893-9454",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "4",
}