Dishonest Signaling During Aggressive Interactions: Theory and Empirical Evidence

Robbie S. Wilson, Michael Angilletta

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

13 Scopus citations

Abstract

Communication between members of the same species often involves a conflict of interest, and the role that deception plays in this conflict has fascinated researchers for decades. The primary concern has been to understand what maintains honest communication despite the temptation to deceive opponents. In this chapter, we pursue the subject of dishonesty and discuss its importance during communication between animals competing for limited resources. We briefly review the relevant theory and analyze empirical studies that support the existence of deception in animal populations. In considering the mounting evidence for dishonest communication, we consider whether deception provides the only explanation. We also explain how functional studies of animal performance can inform evolutionary analyses of dishonest signalling between competitors.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationAnimal Signaling and Function
Subtitle of host publicationAn Integrative Approach
PublisherWiley-Blackwell
Pages205-227
Number of pages23
Volume9780470546000
ISBN (Electronic)9781118966624
ISBN (Print)9780470546000
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 20 2015

Keywords

  • Aggression
  • Deception
  • Dishonesty
  • Game theory
  • Signaling

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Agricultural and Biological Sciences(all)
  • Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology(all)

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