Constrained consensus for bargaining in dynamic coalitional TU games

Angelia Nedić, Dario Bauso

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) games where, at each time, the characteristic function is a random vector with realizations restricted to some set of values. We assume that the players in the game interact only with their neighbors, where the neighbors may vary over time. The main contributions of the paper are the definition of a robust (coalitional) TU game and the development of a distributed bargaining protocol. We prove the convergence with probability 1 of the bargaining protocol to a random allocation that lies in the core of the robust game under some mild conditions on the players' communication graphs.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011
Pages229-234
Number of pages6
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2011
Event2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011 - Orlando, FL, United States
Duration: Dec 12 2011Dec 15 2011

Publication series

NameProceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
ISSN (Print)0191-2216

Other

Other2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011
CountryUnited States
CityOrlando, FL
Period12/12/1112/15/11

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Control and Optimization

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  • Cite this

    Nedić, A., & Bauso, D. (2011). Constrained consensus for bargaining in dynamic coalitional TU games. In 2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011 (pp. 229-234). [6160508] (Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control). https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2011.6160508