Constrained consensus for bargaining in dynamic coalitional TU games

Angelia Nedić; Dario Bauso

doi:10.1109/CDC.2011.6160508

Constrained consensus for bargaining in dynamic coalitional TU games

Angelia Nedić, Dario Bauso

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) games where, at each time, the characteristic function is a random vector with realizations restricted to some set of values. We assume that the players in the game interact only with their neighbors, where the neighbors may vary over time. The main contributions of the paper are the definition of a robust (coalitional) TU game and the development of a distributed bargaining protocol. We prove the convergence with probability 1 of the bargaining protocol to a random allocation that lies in the core of the robust game under some mild conditions on the players' communication graphs.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages	229-234
Number of pages	6
ISBN (Print)	9781612848006
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2011.6160508
State	Published - 2011
Externally published	Yes
Event	2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011 - Orlando, FL, United States Duration: Dec 12 2011 → Dec 15 2011

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
ISSN (Print)	0743-1546
ISSN (Electronic)	2576-2370

Other

Other	2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011
Country/Territory	United States
City	Orlando, FL
Period	12/12/11 → 12/15/11

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Control and Systems Engineering
Modeling and Simulation
Control and Optimization

Access to Document

10.1109/CDC.2011.6160508

Cite this

Nedić, A., & Bauso, D. (2011). Constrained consensus for bargaining in dynamic coalitional TU games. In 2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011 (pp. 229-234). Article 6160508 (Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2011.6160508

Constrained consensus for bargaining in dynamic coalitional TU games. / Nedić, Angelia; Bauso, Dario.
2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2011. p. 229-234 6160508 (Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Nedić, A & Bauso, D 2011, Constrained consensus for bargaining in dynamic coalitional TU games. in 2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011., 6160508, Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 229-234, 2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011, Orlando, FL, United States, 12/12/11. https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2011.6160508

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Constrained consensus for bargaining in dynamic coalitional TU games

Abstract

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

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