TY - GEN
T1 - 25.2 A Reconfigurable RRAM Physically Unclonable Function Utilizing Post-Process Randomness Source with <6×10-6 Native Bit Error Rate
AU - Pang, Yachuan
AU - Gao, Bin
AU - Wu, Dong
AU - Yi, Shengyu
AU - Liu, Qi
AU - Chen, Wei Hao
AU - Chang, Ting Wei
AU - Lin, Wei En
AU - Sun, Xiaoyu
AU - Yu, Shimeng
AU - Qian, He
AU - Chang, Meng Fan
AU - Wu, Huaqiang
N1 - Funding Information:
This work is supported in part by the NSFC (61674092), MOST of China (2016YFA0201803), Beijing Innovation Center for Future Chip (ICFC), Beijing Municipal Science and Technology Project (Z181100003218001), NSF-CNS-1615774 and SRC-2016-TS-2691, and Tsinghua and National Tsinghua joint project.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 IEEE.
PY - 2019/3/6
Y1 - 2019/3/6
N2 - Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) are promising primitives for hardware security with wide applications in the lnternet of Things (IoT), e.g., authentication and encryption key generation [1, 2]. Most silicon PUFs utilize process variability of semiconductor manufacturing [1, 3, 4]. These implementations are sensitive to variations in operating conditions (e.g., supply voltage and temperature variations) and undergo significant native bit-error-rates (N-BERs). Thus, additional stabilizing strategies, such as ECC, majority voting, and masking, are necessary. Furthermore, the PUF key after enrollment cannot be changed in prior implementations [1-5]. This could be unsafe if the PUFs are repeatedly used in insecure environments, as PUFs suffer from the challenges of ownership change and overuse (Fig. 25.2.1).
AB - Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) are promising primitives for hardware security with wide applications in the lnternet of Things (IoT), e.g., authentication and encryption key generation [1, 2]. Most silicon PUFs utilize process variability of semiconductor manufacturing [1, 3, 4]. These implementations are sensitive to variations in operating conditions (e.g., supply voltage and temperature variations) and undergo significant native bit-error-rates (N-BERs). Thus, additional stabilizing strategies, such as ECC, majority voting, and masking, are necessary. Furthermore, the PUF key after enrollment cannot be changed in prior implementations [1-5]. This could be unsafe if the PUFs are repeatedly used in insecure environments, as PUFs suffer from the challenges of ownership change and overuse (Fig. 25.2.1).
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U2 - 10.1109/ISSCC.2019.8662307
DO - 10.1109/ISSCC.2019.8662307
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85063502937
T3 - Digest of Technical Papers - IEEE International Solid-State Circuits Conference
SP - 402
EP - 404
BT - 2019 IEEE International Solid-State Circuits Conference, ISSCC 2019
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 2019 IEEE International Solid-State Circuits Conference, ISSCC 2019
Y2 - 17 February 2019 through 21 February 2019
ER -