Yes, the baby should live: A pro-choice response to Giubilini and Minerva

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In their paper 'After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?' Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva argue that because there are no significant differences between a fetus and a neonate, in that neither possess sufficiently robust mental traits to qualify as persons, a neonate may be justifiably killed for any reason that also justifies abortion. To further emphasise their view that a newly born infant is more on a par with a fetus rather than a more developed baby, Giubilini and Minerva elect to call this 'after-birth abortion' rather than infanticide. In this paper, I argue that their thesis is incorrect, and that the moral permissibility of abortion does not entail the moral permissibility of 'after-birth' abortion.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)330-335
Number of pages6
JournalJournal of Medical Ethics
Volume39
Issue number5
DOIs
StatePublished - May 2013

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baby
abortion
Parturition
Fetus
Infanticide
Newborn Infant
infant
Abortion
human being
Permissibility

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Health Policy
  • Health(social science)
  • Issues, ethics and legal aspects
  • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)

Cite this

Yes, the baby should live : A pro-choice response to Giubilini and Minerva. / Manninen, Bertha.

In: Journal of Medical Ethics, Vol. 39, No. 5, 05.2013, p. 330-335.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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