Abstract
In their paper 'After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?' Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva argue that because there are no significant differences between a fetus and a neonate, in that neither possess sufficiently robust mental traits to qualify as persons, a neonate may be justifiably killed for any reason that also justifies abortion. To further emphasise their view that a newly born infant is more on a par with a fetus rather than a more developed baby, Giubilini and Minerva elect to call this 'after-birth abortion' rather than infanticide. In this paper, I argue that their thesis is incorrect, and that the moral permissibility of abortion does not entail the moral permissibility of 'after-birth' abortion.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 330-335 |
Number of pages | 6 |
Journal | Journal of Medical Ethics |
Volume | 39 |
Issue number | 5 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - May 2013 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Issues, ethics and legal aspects
- Health(social science)
- Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
- Health Policy