Why Lewis’ appeal to natural properties fails to Kripke’s rule-following paradox

Carla Merino-Rajme

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

I consider Lewis’ appeal to naturalness to solve Kripke’s rule-following paradox. I then present a different interpretation of this paradox and offer reasons for thinking that this is what Kripke had in mind. I argue that Lewis’ proposal cannot provide a solution to this version of paradox.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)163-175
Number of pages13
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume172
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2015
Externally publishedYes

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Paradox
Naturalness

Keywords

  • Kripke
  • Lewis
  • Meaning intentions
  • Natural properties
  • Rule following
  • Rule following paradox

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Why Lewis’ appeal to natural properties fails to Kripke’s rule-following paradox. / Merino-Rajme, Carla.

In: Philosophical Studies, Vol. 172, No. 1, 2015, p. 163-175.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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