What stops the torture?

Courtenay Ryals Conrad, Will H. Moore

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

101 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

States whose agents engage in torture in a given year have a 93% chance of continuing to torture in the following year. What leads governments to stop the use of torture? We focus on the principal-agent relationship between the executive and the individuals responsible for supervising and interrogating state prisoners. We argue that some liberal democratic institutions change the probability that leaders support the creation of institutions that discourage jailers and interrogators from engaging in torture, thus increasing the probability of a state terminating its use of torture. These relationships are strongly conditioned by the presence of violent dissent; states rarely terminate the use of torture when they face a threat. Once campaigns of violent dissent stop, however, states with popular suffrage and a free press are considerably more likely to terminate their use of torture. Also given the end of violent dissent, the greater the number of veto points in government, the lower the likelihood that a state terminates its use of torture.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)459-476
Number of pages18
JournalAmerican Journal of Political Science
Volume54
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 2010
Externally publishedYes

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

What stops the torture? / Conrad, Courtenay Ryals; Moore, Will H.

In: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 54, No. 2, 04.2010, p. 459-476.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Conrad, Courtenay Ryals ; Moore, Will H. / What stops the torture?. In: American Journal of Political Science. 2010 ; Vol. 54, No. 2. pp. 459-476.
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