What is extreme about Mises’s extreme apriorism?

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

There is something extreme about Ludwig von Mises’s methodological apriorism, namely, his epistemological justification of the a priori element(s) of economic theory. His critics have long recognized and attacked the extremeness of Mises’s epistemology of a priori knowledge. However, several of his defenders have neglected what is (and what has long been recognized by his critics to be) extreme about Mises’s apriorism. Thus, the argument is directed less against Mises than against those contributions to the secondary literature that assert his methodological moderation while overlooking what the most prominent critics have found extreme about Mises’s apriorism. Defending Mises as a merely moderate apriorist because he held only a narrow part of the foundation of economics to be a priori is a straw-man defense against criticisms of his apriorism as epistemologically extreme.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)226-249
Number of pages24
JournalJournal of Economic Methodology
Volume24
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 3 2017
Externally publishedYes

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Epistemology
Justification
Criticism
Moderation
Economics
Economic theory

Keywords

  • apriorism
  • Austrian economics
  • F.A. Hayek
  • Ludwig von Mises
  • Mark Blaug
  • Terence Hutchison

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)

Cite this

What is extreme about Mises’s extreme apriorism? / Scheall, Scott.

In: Journal of Economic Methodology, Vol. 24, No. 3, 03.07.2017, p. 226-249.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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