What do double dissociations prove?

Guy C. Van Orden, Bruce F. Pennington, Greg Stone

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

143 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Brain damage may doubly dissociate cognitive modules, but the practice of revealing dissociations is predicated on modularity being true (T. Shallice, 1988). This article questions the utility of assuming modularity, as it examines a paradigmatic double dissociation of reading modules. Reading modules illustrate two general problems. First, modularity fails to converge on a fixed set of exclusionary criteria that define pure cases. As a consequence, competing modular theories force perennial quests for purer cases, which simply perpetuates growth in the list of exclusionary criteria. The first problem leads, in part, to the second problem. Modularity fails to converge on a fixed set of pure cases. The second failure perpetuates unending fractionation into more modules.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)111-172
Number of pages62
JournalCognitive Science
Volume25
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2001

Fingerprint

Reading
Fractionation
brain damage
Brain
Growth
Double Dissociation
Module
Modularity

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Language and Linguistics
  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Cognitive Neuroscience
  • Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
  • Human Factors and Ergonomics
  • Linguistics and Language

Cite this

What do double dissociations prove? / Van Orden, Guy C.; Pennington, Bruce F.; Stone, Greg.

In: Cognitive Science, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2001, p. 111-172.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Van Orden, Guy C. ; Pennington, Bruce F. ; Stone, Greg. / What do double dissociations prove?. In: Cognitive Science. 2001 ; Vol. 25, No. 1. pp. 111-172.
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