TY - JOUR
T1 - What do double dissociations prove?
AU - Van Orden, Guy C.
AU - Pennington, Bruce F.
AU - Stone, Greg
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank Bill Bechtel, Walter Freeman, Ray Gibbs, Art Jacobs, Dick Olson, Ken Paap, Todd Maddox, George Mandler, Jeff Miller, Michelle Podgornik, Roger Schvaneveldt, Nina Silverberg, Mike Turvey, Cees van Leeuwen, Ted Wright and anonymous reviewers who contributed to this article with suggestions, comments, or other help. Also, we thank Gary Barnes, Stan Smith, and Diane Williams for access to patients and help with conducting the studies. Most of all, we thank Anny Bosman, Bill Farrar, Steve Goldinger, Jay Holden, and Marian Jansen op de Haar who provided detailed comments on manuscripts. This research was funded by a National Research Service Award from the National Institutes of Mental Health (1 F32 MH09506), a FIRST award from the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (CMS 5 R29 NS26247), and an Independent Scientist Award from the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (1 K02 NS 01905).
PY - 2001
Y1 - 2001
N2 - Brain damage may doubly dissociate cognitive modules, but the practice of revealing dissociations is predicated on modularity being true (T. Shallice, 1988). This article questions the utility of assuming modularity, as it examines a paradigmatic double dissociation of reading modules. Reading modules illustrate two general problems. First, modularity fails to converge on a fixed set of exclusionary criteria that define pure cases. As a consequence, competing modular theories force perennial quests for purer cases, which simply perpetuates growth in the list of exclusionary criteria. The first problem leads, in part, to the second problem. Modularity fails to converge on a fixed set of pure cases. The second failure perpetuates unending fractionation into more modules.
AB - Brain damage may doubly dissociate cognitive modules, but the practice of revealing dissociations is predicated on modularity being true (T. Shallice, 1988). This article questions the utility of assuming modularity, as it examines a paradigmatic double dissociation of reading modules. Reading modules illustrate two general problems. First, modularity fails to converge on a fixed set of exclusionary criteria that define pure cases. As a consequence, competing modular theories force perennial quests for purer cases, which simply perpetuates growth in the list of exclusionary criteria. The first problem leads, in part, to the second problem. Modularity fails to converge on a fixed set of pure cases. The second failure perpetuates unending fractionation into more modules.
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U2 - 10.1016/S0364-0213(00)00036-7
DO - 10.1016/S0364-0213(00)00036-7
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0035740005
SN - 0364-0213
VL - 25
SP - 111
EP - 172
JO - Cognitive Science
JF - Cognitive Science
IS - 1
ER -