Vulnerability Analysis and Consequences of False Data Injection Attack on Power System State Estimation

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56 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

An unobservable false data injection (FDI) attack on AC state estimation (SE) is introduced and its consequences on the physical system are studied. With a focus on understanding the physical consequences of FDI attacks, a bi-level optimization problem is introduced whose objective is to maximize the physical line flows subsequent to an FDI attack on DC SE. The maximization is subject to constraints on both attacker resources (size of attack) and attack detection (limiting load shifts) as well as those required by DC optimal power flow (OPF) following SE. The resulting attacks are tested on a more realistic non-linear system model using AC state estimation and ACOPF, and it is shown that, with an appropriately chosen sub-network, the attacker can overload transmission lines with moderate shifts of load.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalIEEE Transactions on Power Systems
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - Dec 25 2015

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State estimation
Nonlinear systems
Electric lines

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Energy Engineering and Power Technology

Cite this

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title = "Vulnerability Analysis and Consequences of False Data Injection Attack on Power System State Estimation",
abstract = "An unobservable false data injection (FDI) attack on AC state estimation (SE) is introduced and its consequences on the physical system are studied. With a focus on understanding the physical consequences of FDI attacks, a bi-level optimization problem is introduced whose objective is to maximize the physical line flows subsequent to an FDI attack on DC SE. The maximization is subject to constraints on both attacker resources (size of attack) and attack detection (limiting load shifts) as well as those required by DC optimal power flow (OPF) following SE. The resulting attacks are tested on a more realistic non-linear system model using AC state estimation and ACOPF, and it is shown that, with an appropriately chosen sub-network, the attacker can overload transmission lines with moderate shifts of load.",
author = "Jingwen Liang and Lalitha Sankar and Oliver Kosut",
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