Untangling safeguard and production coordination effects in long-term buyer-supplier relationships

Luiz Mesquita, Thomas H. Brush

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

124 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We untangle safeguard and coordination effects of interfirm governance mechanisms in the context of hazardous buyer-supplier relationships. We propose that the extent to which such mechanisms prevail as safeguards or coordination devices varies with the moderating effects of complexity and asset specificity. In nonspecific but complex exchanges, such mechanisms operate more as coordination mechanisms, whereas in specific, noncomplex ones, they are safeguard mechanisms. Through a system of mathematical derivatives, we specify and quantify these conditions to demonstrate when each theoretical perspective is more relevant. We validate our model with survey data from 239 suppliers and explore implications for theory and practice.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)785-807
Number of pages23
JournalAcademy of Management Journal
Volume51
Issue number4
StatePublished - Aug 2008

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Derivatives
Safeguards
Buyer-supplier relationships
Survey data
Moderating effect
Governance mechanisms
Coordination mechanism
Asset specificity
Suppliers

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Management of Technology and Innovation
  • Strategy and Management
  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)

Cite this

Untangling safeguard and production coordination effects in long-term buyer-supplier relationships. / Mesquita, Luiz; Brush, Thomas H.

In: Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 51, No. 4, 08.2008, p. 785-807.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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