Unraveling the multiple margins of rent generation from individual transferable quotas

Matthew N. Reimer, Joshua Abbott, James E. Wilen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

22 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) induce changes along both the extensive margin-via consolidation of quota among fewer vessels-and the intensive margin, as harvesters adjust their behavior to ITQ incentives. We use ITQ introduction in the Bering Sea crab fishery to decompose the sources of rent generation across both margins. We embed an empirically calibrated structural model of the harvesting process into a sector-level model, allowing us to experimentally "unravel" the ITQ treatment. We show that the magnitude and source of rent generation under ITQs critically depends on the manner and degree of rent dissipation before ITQs are implemented. (JEL Q22, Q28).

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)538-559
Number of pages22
JournalLand Economics
Volume90
Issue number3
StatePublished - 2014

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crab fishery
consolidation
dissipation
incentive
vessel
Individual transferable quotas
Rent
Margin
sea

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Environmental Science (miscellaneous)

Cite this

Unraveling the multiple margins of rent generation from individual transferable quotas. / Reimer, Matthew N.; Abbott, Joshua; Wilen, James E.

In: Land Economics, Vol. 90, No. 3, 2014, p. 538-559.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Reimer, Matthew N. ; Abbott, Joshua ; Wilen, James E. / Unraveling the multiple margins of rent generation from individual transferable quotas. In: Land Economics. 2014 ; Vol. 90, No. 3. pp. 538-559.
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