Unobservable False Data Injection Attacks against PMUs: Feasible Conditions and Multiplicative Attacks

Zhigang Chu, Jiazi Zhang, Oliver Kosut, Lalitha Sankar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

10 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper studies false data injection (FDI) attacks against phasor measurement units (PMUs). As compared to the conventional bad data detector (BDD), an enhanced BDD utilizing the effect of zero injection buses is proposed. Feasible conditions under which FDI attacks are unobservable to this enhanced BDD are discussed. In addition, a class of multiplicative FDI attacks that maintain the rank of the PMU measurement matrix is introduced. Simulation results on the IEEE RTS-24-bus system indicate that the these multiplicative unobservable attacks can avoid detection by both the enhanced BDD and a detector based on low-rank decomposition proposed in prior work.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2018
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Electronic)9781538679548
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 24 2018
Event2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2018 - Aalborg, Denmark
Duration: Oct 29 2018Oct 31 2018

Publication series

Name2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2018

Other

Other2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2018
Country/TerritoryDenmark
CityAalborg
Period10/29/1810/31/18

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Energy Engineering and Power Technology

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