Truthful incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing

Xiang Zhang, Guoliang Xue, Ruozhou Yu, Dejun Yang, Jian Tang

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

89 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

With the prosperity of smart devices, crowdsourcing has emerged as a new computing/networking paradigm. Through the crowdsourcing platform, service requesters can buy service from service providers. An important component of crowdsourcing is its incentive mechanism. We study three models of crowdsourcing, which involve cooperation and competition among the service providers. Our simplest model generalizes the well-known user-centric model studied in a recent Mobicom paper. We design an incentive mechanism for each of the three models, and prove that these incentive mechanisms are individually rational, budget-balanced, computationally efficient, and truthful.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings - IEEE INFOCOM
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages2830-2838
Number of pages9
Volume26
ISBN (Print)9781479983810
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 21 2015
Event34th IEEE Annual Conference on Computer Communications and Networks, IEEE INFOCOM 2015 - Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Duration: Apr 26 2015May 1 2015

Other

Other34th IEEE Annual Conference on Computer Communications and Networks, IEEE INFOCOM 2015
CountryHong Kong
CityHong Kong
Period4/26/155/1/15

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Zhang, X., Xue, G., Yu, R., Yang, D., & Tang, J. (2015). Truthful incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing. In Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM (Vol. 26, pp. 2830-2838). [7218676] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/INFOCOM.2015.7218676

Truthful incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing. / Zhang, Xiang; Xue, Guoliang; Yu, Ruozhou; Yang, Dejun; Tang, Jian.

Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM. Vol. 26 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2015. p. 2830-2838 7218676.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Zhang, X, Xue, G, Yu, R, Yang, D & Tang, J 2015, Truthful incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing. in Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM. vol. 26, 7218676, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 2830-2838, 34th IEEE Annual Conference on Computer Communications and Networks, IEEE INFOCOM 2015, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 4/26/15. https://doi.org/10.1109/INFOCOM.2015.7218676
Zhang X, Xue G, Yu R, Yang D, Tang J. Truthful incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing. In Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM. Vol. 26. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2015. p. 2830-2838. 7218676 https://doi.org/10.1109/INFOCOM.2015.7218676
Zhang, Xiang ; Xue, Guoliang ; Yu, Ruozhou ; Yang, Dejun ; Tang, Jian. / Truthful incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing. Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM. Vol. 26 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2015. pp. 2830-2838
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