Truthful group buying-based spectrum auction design for cognitive radio networks

Dejun Yang, Guoliang Xue, Xiang Zhang

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

20 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Recent spectrum auction results have shown that the spectrum is usually sold at a very high unit price. Small network providers may not be able to afford it individually. Inspired by the group buying service on the Internet, group buying strategy has been introduced into the design for spectrum auctions to increase the buying power of small network providers as a whole. In this paper, we consider cognitive radio networks with multiple secondary networks, each of which consists of one secondary access point and a number of secondary users interested in accessing channels licensed to the primary user. We propose TRUBA, a truthful group buying-based auction to take advantage of the collective buying power of secondary users within each secondary network. We carefully design the budget extraction for each secondary access point within the secondary network to maximize the budget collected from the secondary users. In addition, we allow the primary user to assign its channels strategically so as to maximize its profit on each secondary network. These two features together make TRUBA significantly improve the system performance, compared to the existing group buying-based auction, in terms of the number of successful transactions (up to 105% in the evaluation results), the number of winning secondary users (up to 129%), the utility of secondary access points (up to 463%), and the utility of the primary user (up to 119%).

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2014 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2014
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Pages2295-2300
Number of pages6
ISBN (Print)9781479920037
DOIs
StatePublished - 2014
Event2014 1st IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2014 - Sydney, NSW, Australia
Duration: Jun 10 2014Jun 14 2014

Other

Other2014 1st IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2014
CountryAustralia
CitySydney, NSW
Period6/10/146/14/14

Fingerprint

Cognitive radio
Profitability
Internet

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications

Cite this

Yang, D., Xue, G., & Zhang, X. (2014). Truthful group buying-based spectrum auction design for cognitive radio networks. In 2014 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2014 (pp. 2295-2300). [6883665] IEEE Computer Society. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICC.2014.6883665

Truthful group buying-based spectrum auction design for cognitive radio networks. / Yang, Dejun; Xue, Guoliang; Zhang, Xiang.

2014 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2014. IEEE Computer Society, 2014. p. 2295-2300 6883665.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Yang, D, Xue, G & Zhang, X 2014, Truthful group buying-based spectrum auction design for cognitive radio networks. in 2014 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2014., 6883665, IEEE Computer Society, pp. 2295-2300, 2014 1st IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2014, Sydney, NSW, Australia, 6/10/14. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICC.2014.6883665
Yang D, Xue G, Zhang X. Truthful group buying-based spectrum auction design for cognitive radio networks. In 2014 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2014. IEEE Computer Society. 2014. p. 2295-2300. 6883665 https://doi.org/10.1109/ICC.2014.6883665
Yang, Dejun ; Xue, Guoliang ; Zhang, Xiang. / Truthful group buying-based spectrum auction design for cognitive radio networks. 2014 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2014. IEEE Computer Society, 2014. pp. 2295-2300
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