Truthful auction for cooperative communications with revenue maximization

Dejun Yang, Xi Fang, Guoliang Xue

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

15 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Auction theory has been applied to cooperative communications to either efficiently allocate resources or incentivize wireless devices to participate in cooperative communications. However, a common shortcoming of the existing studies is that the revenue generation is neglected. Revenue generation is the ultimate goal of commercial networks, e.g., WiMAX networks. In this paper, we study the problem of how to use auction mechanisms to allocate the relay nodes and charge the source nodes, such that the revenue of the seller, e.g., the base station, is maximized. We first propose a VCG-based auction mechanism, which can maximize the revenue while enforcing the truthfulness. To overcome the high time complexity of the VCG-based auction mechanism, we further design another truthful auction mechanism with low time complexity. Experiment results show that the suboptimal auction mechanism significantly reduces the time complexity without severely sacrificing the revenue.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationIEEE International Conference on Communications
Pages4888-4892
Number of pages5
DOIs
StatePublished - 2012
Event2012 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2012 - Ottawa, ON, Canada
Duration: Jun 10 2012Jun 15 2012

Other

Other2012 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2012
CountryCanada
CityOttawa, ON
Period6/10/126/15/12

Fingerprint

Cooperative communication
Base stations
Experiments

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Computer Networks and Communications

Cite this

Yang, D., Fang, X., & Xue, G. (2012). Truthful auction for cooperative communications with revenue maximization. In IEEE International Conference on Communications (pp. 4888-4892). [6363632] https://doi.org/10.1109/ICC.2012.6363632

Truthful auction for cooperative communications with revenue maximization. / Yang, Dejun; Fang, Xi; Xue, Guoliang.

IEEE International Conference on Communications. 2012. p. 4888-4892 6363632.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Yang, D, Fang, X & Xue, G 2012, Truthful auction for cooperative communications with revenue maximization. in IEEE International Conference on Communications., 6363632, pp. 4888-4892, 2012 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2012, Ottawa, ON, Canada, 6/10/12. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICC.2012.6363632
Yang D, Fang X, Xue G. Truthful auction for cooperative communications with revenue maximization. In IEEE International Conference on Communications. 2012. p. 4888-4892. 6363632 https://doi.org/10.1109/ICC.2012.6363632
Yang, Dejun ; Fang, Xi ; Xue, Guoliang. / Truthful auction for cooperative communications with revenue maximization. IEEE International Conference on Communications. 2012. pp. 4888-4892
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