Abstract
The scarcity of spectrum channels resides in the limited bandwidth resource and the exploding demand from spectrum-based services and devices. To help ease this scarcity, the concept of cognitive radio networks (CRNs) is proposed, where licensed spectrum holders (primary users) may lease their channels to unlicensed users (secondary users). Many CRN auctions are thus designed to incentivize primary users (PUs) to share their idle channels with secondary users (SUs). Most of these auctions assume that a transmitting PU does not lease its channel to SUs; if it leases its channel to SUs, it does not transmit itself. To further utilize the resource, researchers have studied the scenario where a transmitting PU is allowed to lease its channels to SUs if the transmissions of the SUs do not undermine the transmission of the PU. However, the study assumes that there is only one PU who owns the licensed channels, whereas in practice, channels may be contributed by multiple PUs. This prevents the result of the study from being directly applied to the multi-PU scenario, as the potential competitions among the PUs are neglected. We extend the scenario to the CRN with multiple PUs and propose TDSA-PS as a Truthful Double Spectrum Auction with transmitting Primary users Sharing. We prove that TDSA-PS is truthful, individually rational, budget-balanced, and computationally efficient.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | 2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2018 - Proceedings |
| Publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. |
| Volume | 2018-May |
| ISBN (Print) | 9781538631805 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jul 27 2018 |
| Event | 2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2018 - Kansas City, United States Duration: May 20 2018 → May 24 2018 |
Other
| Other | 2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2018 |
|---|---|
| Country | United States |
| City | Kansas City |
| Period | 5/20/18 → 5/24/18 |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Computer Networks and Communications
- Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Cite this
Transmitting and sharing : A truthful double auction for cognitive radio networks. / Zhang, Xiang; Yang, Dejun; Xue, Guoliang; Yu, Ruozhou; Tang, Jian.
2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2018 - Proceedings. Vol. 2018-May Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018. 8422505.Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution
}
TY - GEN
T1 - Transmitting and sharing
T2 - A truthful double auction for cognitive radio networks
AU - Zhang, Xiang
AU - Yang, Dejun
AU - Xue, Guoliang
AU - Yu, Ruozhou
AU - Tang, Jian
PY - 2018/7/27
Y1 - 2018/7/27
N2 - The scarcity of spectrum channels resides in the limited bandwidth resource and the exploding demand from spectrum-based services and devices. To help ease this scarcity, the concept of cognitive radio networks (CRNs) is proposed, where licensed spectrum holders (primary users) may lease their channels to unlicensed users (secondary users). Many CRN auctions are thus designed to incentivize primary users (PUs) to share their idle channels with secondary users (SUs). Most of these auctions assume that a transmitting PU does not lease its channel to SUs; if it leases its channel to SUs, it does not transmit itself. To further utilize the resource, researchers have studied the scenario where a transmitting PU is allowed to lease its channels to SUs if the transmissions of the SUs do not undermine the transmission of the PU. However, the study assumes that there is only one PU who owns the licensed channels, whereas in practice, channels may be contributed by multiple PUs. This prevents the result of the study from being directly applied to the multi-PU scenario, as the potential competitions among the PUs are neglected. We extend the scenario to the CRN with multiple PUs and propose TDSA-PS as a Truthful Double Spectrum Auction with transmitting Primary users Sharing. We prove that TDSA-PS is truthful, individually rational, budget-balanced, and computationally efficient.
AB - The scarcity of spectrum channels resides in the limited bandwidth resource and the exploding demand from spectrum-based services and devices. To help ease this scarcity, the concept of cognitive radio networks (CRNs) is proposed, where licensed spectrum holders (primary users) may lease their channels to unlicensed users (secondary users). Many CRN auctions are thus designed to incentivize primary users (PUs) to share their idle channels with secondary users (SUs). Most of these auctions assume that a transmitting PU does not lease its channel to SUs; if it leases its channel to SUs, it does not transmit itself. To further utilize the resource, researchers have studied the scenario where a transmitting PU is allowed to lease its channels to SUs if the transmissions of the SUs do not undermine the transmission of the PU. However, the study assumes that there is only one PU who owns the licensed channels, whereas in practice, channels may be contributed by multiple PUs. This prevents the result of the study from being directly applied to the multi-PU scenario, as the potential competitions among the PUs are neglected. We extend the scenario to the CRN with multiple PUs and propose TDSA-PS as a Truthful Double Spectrum Auction with transmitting Primary users Sharing. We prove that TDSA-PS is truthful, individually rational, budget-balanced, and computationally efficient.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85051444456&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/ICC.2018.8422505
DO - 10.1109/ICC.2018.8422505
M3 - Conference contribution
SN - 9781538631805
VL - 2018-May
BT - 2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2018 - Proceedings
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ER -