Transmitting and sharing: A truthful double auction for cognitive radio networks

Xiang Zhang, Dejun Yang, Guoliang Xue, Ruozhou Yu, Jian Tang

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

The scarcity of spectrum channels resides in the limited bandwidth resource and the exploding demand from spectrum-based services and devices. To help ease this scarcity, the concept of cognitive radio networks (CRNs) is proposed, where licensed spectrum holders (primary users) may lease their channels to unlicensed users (secondary users). Many CRN auctions are thus designed to incentivize primary users (PUs) to share their idle channels with secondary users (SUs). Most of these auctions assume that a transmitting PU does not lease its channel to SUs; if it leases its channel to SUs, it does not transmit itself. To further utilize the resource, researchers have studied the scenario where a transmitting PU is allowed to lease its channels to SUs if the transmissions of the SUs do not undermine the transmission of the PU. However, the study assumes that there is only one PU who owns the licensed channels, whereas in practice, channels may be contributed by multiple PUs. This prevents the result of the study from being directly applied to the multi-PU scenario, as the potential competitions among the PUs are neglected. We extend the scenario to the CRN with multiple PUs and propose TDSA-PS as a Truthful Double Spectrum Auction with transmitting Primary users Sharing. We prove that TDSA-PS is truthful, individually rational, budget-balanced, and computationally efficient.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2018 - Proceedings
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Volume2018-May
ISBN (Print)9781538631805
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 27 2018
Event2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2018 - Kansas City, United States
Duration: May 20 2018May 24 2018

Other

Other2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2018
CountryUnited States
CityKansas City
Period5/20/185/24/18

Fingerprint

Cognitive radio
Bandwidth

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Zhang, X., Yang, D., Xue, G., Yu, R., & Tang, J. (2018). Transmitting and sharing: A truthful double auction for cognitive radio networks. In 2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2018 - Proceedings (Vol. 2018-May). [8422505] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICC.2018.8422505

Transmitting and sharing : A truthful double auction for cognitive radio networks. / Zhang, Xiang; Yang, Dejun; Xue, Guoliang; Yu, Ruozhou; Tang, Jian.

2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2018 - Proceedings. Vol. 2018-May Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018. 8422505.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Zhang, X, Yang, D, Xue, G, Yu, R & Tang, J 2018, Transmitting and sharing: A truthful double auction for cognitive radio networks. in 2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2018 - Proceedings. vol. 2018-May, 8422505, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2018, Kansas City, United States, 5/20/18. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICC.2018.8422505
Zhang X, Yang D, Xue G, Yu R, Tang J. Transmitting and sharing: A truthful double auction for cognitive radio networks. In 2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2018 - Proceedings. Vol. 2018-May. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2018. 8422505 https://doi.org/10.1109/ICC.2018.8422505
Zhang, Xiang ; Yang, Dejun ; Xue, Guoliang ; Yu, Ruozhou ; Tang, Jian. / Transmitting and sharing : A truthful double auction for cognitive radio networks. 2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2018 - Proceedings. Vol. 2018-May Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018.
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