Theorizing regulatory intermediaries: The rit model

Kenneth Abbott, David Levi-Faur, Duncan Snidal

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

32 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Regulation is typically conceived as a two-party relationship between a rule-maker or regulator (R) and a rule-taker or target (T). We set out an agenda for the study of regulation as a three- (or more) party relationship, with intermediaries (I) at the center of the analysis. Intermediaries play major and varied roles in regulation, from providing expertise and feedback to facilitating implementation, from monitoring the behavior of regulatory targets to building communities of assurance and trust. After developing the basic regulator- intermediary-target (RIT) model, we discuss important extensions and variations of the model. We then discuss the varieties of regulatory capture that may appear where intermediaries are involved.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)14-35
Number of pages22
JournalAnnals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
Volume670
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2017

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regulation
expertise
monitoring
community

Keywords

  • Capture
  • Intermediaries
  • Orchestration
  • Regulation
  • Regulatory governance
  • Rule-makers
  • Rule-takers

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Social Sciences(all)

Cite this

Theorizing regulatory intermediaries : The rit model. / Abbott, Kenneth; Levi-Faur, David; Snidal, Duncan.

In: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 670, No. 1, 2017, p. 14-35.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abbott, Kenneth ; Levi-Faur, David ; Snidal, Duncan. / Theorizing regulatory intermediaries : The rit model. In: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 2017 ; Vol. 670, No. 1. pp. 14-35.
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