The value of victory: Social origins of the winner's curse in common value auctions

Wouter Van Den Bos, Jian Li, Tatiana Lau, Eric Maskin, Jonathan D. Cohen, P. Read Montague, Samuel McClure

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

33 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Auctions, normally considered as devices facilitating trade, also provide a way to probe mechanisms governing one's valuation of some good or action. One of the most intriguing phenomena in auction behavior is the winner's curse - the strong tendency of participants to bid more than rational agent theory prescribes, often at a significant loss. The prevailing explanation suggests that humans have limited cognitive abilities that make estimating the correct bid difficult, if not impossible. Using a series of auction structures, we found that bidding approaches rational agent predictions when participants compete against a computer. However, the winner's curse appears when participants compete against other humans, even when cognitive demands for the correct bidding strategy are removed. These results suggest the humans assign significant future value to victories over human but not over computer opponents even though such victories may incur immediate losses, and that this valuation anomaly is the origin of apparently irrational behavior.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)483-492
Number of pages10
JournalJudgment and Decision Making
Volume3
Issue number7
StatePublished - Oct 2008
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Aptitude
Equipment and Supplies
Common-value auctions
Winner's curse
Auctions
Bid
Anomaly
Prediction
Cognitive ability
Bidding strategy
Bidding

Keywords

  • Auctions
  • Bounded rationality
  • Winner's curse

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Decision Sciences(all)
  • Applied Psychology

Cite this

Van Den Bos, W., Li, J., Lau, T., Maskin, E., Cohen, J. D., Montague, P. R., & McClure, S. (2008). The value of victory: Social origins of the winner's curse in common value auctions. Judgment and Decision Making, 3(7), 483-492.

The value of victory : Social origins of the winner's curse in common value auctions. / Van Den Bos, Wouter; Li, Jian; Lau, Tatiana; Maskin, Eric; Cohen, Jonathan D.; Montague, P. Read; McClure, Samuel.

In: Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 7, 10.2008, p. 483-492.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Van Den Bos, W, Li, J, Lau, T, Maskin, E, Cohen, JD, Montague, PR & McClure, S 2008, 'The value of victory: Social origins of the winner's curse in common value auctions', Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 3, no. 7, pp. 483-492.
Van Den Bos W, Li J, Lau T, Maskin E, Cohen JD, Montague PR et al. The value of victory: Social origins of the winner's curse in common value auctions. Judgment and Decision Making. 2008 Oct;3(7):483-492.
Van Den Bos, Wouter ; Li, Jian ; Lau, Tatiana ; Maskin, Eric ; Cohen, Jonathan D. ; Montague, P. Read ; McClure, Samuel. / The value of victory : Social origins of the winner's curse in common value auctions. In: Judgment and Decision Making. 2008 ; Vol. 3, No. 7. pp. 483-492.
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