The role of family ties in agency contracts

Luis Gomez-Mejia, Manuel Nuñez-Nickel, Isabel Gutierrez

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

637 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Drawing on data based on the entire population of Spanish newspapers over 27 years (1966-93), this study shows that firm performance and business risk are much stronger predictors of chief executive tenure when a firm's owners and its executive have family ties and that the organizational consequences of CEO dismissal are more favorable when the replaced CEO is a member of the family owning the firm. The study also demonstrates that executives operating under weakly relational (less ambiguous) contracts are held more accountable for firm performance and business risk outcomes even under nonfamily contracting.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)81-95
Number of pages15
JournalAcademy of Management Journal
Volume44
Issue number1
StatePublished - Feb 2001

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Industry
Firm performance
Family ties
Business risk
Chief executive officer
Owners
Tenure
Predictors
Chief executives
Contracting

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Business and International Management
  • Management of Technology and Innovation
  • Strategy and Management

Cite this

Gomez-Mejia, L., Nuñez-Nickel, M., & Gutierrez, I. (2001). The role of family ties in agency contracts. Academy of Management Journal, 44(1), 81-95.

The role of family ties in agency contracts. / Gomez-Mejia, Luis; Nuñez-Nickel, Manuel; Gutierrez, Isabel.

In: Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 44, No. 1, 02.2001, p. 81-95.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Gomez-Mejia, L, Nuñez-Nickel, M & Gutierrez, I 2001, 'The role of family ties in agency contracts', Academy of Management Journal, vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 81-95.
Gomez-Mejia L, Nuñez-Nickel M, Gutierrez I. The role of family ties in agency contracts. Academy of Management Journal. 2001 Feb;44(1):81-95.
Gomez-Mejia, Luis ; Nuñez-Nickel, Manuel ; Gutierrez, Isabel. / The role of family ties in agency contracts. In: Academy of Management Journal. 2001 ; Vol. 44, No. 1. pp. 81-95.
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