TY - JOUR
T1 - The Relationship between Short-Term Political Appointments and Bureaucratic Performance
T2 - The Case of Recess Appointments in the United States
AU - Miller, Susan M.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2014 The Author. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Inc. All rights reserved.
PY - 2015/7/1
Y1 - 2015/7/1
N2 - Within the bureaucratic performance literature, a growing body of work focuses on the relationship between the character of an administrator's selection - career administrators versus different types of appointees - and bureaucratic performance, finding that programs managed by political appointees are associated with lower performance scores than programs managed by career professionals. One aspect of administrators' selection that has not been considered in connection with bureaucratic performance is whether the appointee was installed via recess appointment. Because their limited and uncertain tenures may cause administrative problems and because the unilateral nature of their selection may lead executives to prioritize other characteristics over competency, I theorize that recess appointees will be associated with lower program performance than non-recess appointees and careerists. Using Program Assessment Rating Tool scores from the George W. Bush administration, I find support for this expectation. This article contributes to our understanding of the ways in which staffing through recess appointments may shape government administration.
AB - Within the bureaucratic performance literature, a growing body of work focuses on the relationship between the character of an administrator's selection - career administrators versus different types of appointees - and bureaucratic performance, finding that programs managed by political appointees are associated with lower performance scores than programs managed by career professionals. One aspect of administrators' selection that has not been considered in connection with bureaucratic performance is whether the appointee was installed via recess appointment. Because their limited and uncertain tenures may cause administrative problems and because the unilateral nature of their selection may lead executives to prioritize other characteristics over competency, I theorize that recess appointees will be associated with lower program performance than non-recess appointees and careerists. Using Program Assessment Rating Tool scores from the George W. Bush administration, I find support for this expectation. This article contributes to our understanding of the ways in which staffing through recess appointments may shape government administration.
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U2 - 10.1093/jopart/muu037
DO - 10.1093/jopart/muu037
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84940822756
SN - 1053-1858
VL - 25
SP - 777
EP - 796
JO - Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
JF - Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
IS - 3
ER -