The public company whistleblowing environment: Perceptions of a wrongful act and monetary attitude

Alisa G. Brink, David Lowe, Lisa M. Victoravich

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) and Dodd-Frank Acts created a unique environment for whistleblowing at public companies. SOX requires public companies to establish anonymous reporting channels, and Dodd-Frank outlines substantial monetary incentives for reporting securities law violations directly to the SEC. In response to these provisions, this study examines whether the type of securities law violation (fraudulent financial reporting versus insider trading), individuals’ psychological assessments of the wrongdoing, and individuals’ monetary attitude influence intentions to report to an internal hotline and to the SEC. We find internal reporting is driven by increased perceptions of responsibility to report a wrongful act, whereas external reporting to the SEC is driven by increased perceptions of seriousness regarding the wrongful act. Finally, we find that individuals’ attitude toward money explains reporting intentions; however, we do not find any evidence that monetary attitude leads to increased reporting to the SEC.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-30
Number of pages30
JournalAccounting and the Public Interest
Volume17
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2017

Fingerprint

Violations
Securities law
Sarbanes-Oxley
Whistle blowing
Financial reporting
Monetary incentives
Psychological
Wrongdoing
Insider trading
Responsibility

Keywords

  • Dodd-Frank act
  • Monetary attitude
  • Responsibility
  • Seriousness
  • Whistleblowing

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting

Cite this

The public company whistleblowing environment : Perceptions of a wrongful act and monetary attitude. / Brink, Alisa G.; Lowe, David; Victoravich, Lisa M.

In: Accounting and the Public Interest, Vol. 17, No. 1, 01.12.2017, p. 1-30.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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