Abstract
Many philosophers are skeptical about the scientific value of the concept of biological information. However, several have recently proposed a more positive view of ascribing information as an exercise in scientific modeling. I argue for an alternative role: guiding empirical data collection for the sake of theorizing about the evolution of semantics. I clarify and expand on Bergstrom and Rosvall's suggestion of taking a "diagnostic" approach that defines biological information operationally as a procedure for collecting empirical cases. The more recent modeling-based accounts still perpetuate a theory-centric view of scientific concepts, which motivated philosophers' misplaced skepticism in the first place.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 175-194 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | Philosophy of Science |
Volume | 81 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Apr 2014 |
Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- History
- Philosophy
- History and Philosophy of Science