Abstract
Using the citizen-candidate model we study the government's choice of institutions for the labour market and the central bank and derive the implications for inflation and employment. We derive conditions for the existence of equilibria in which the labour market is distorted and the central bank is dependent or independent under a range of conditions affecting central bank dependence, the post-election cycle in inflation and employment and inflation bias. Our results imply that average inflation and inflation variability are lower under an independent central bank whereas employment variability can be lower or higher, consistent with evidence for OECD countries.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 43-64 |
| Number of pages | 22 |
| Journal | Economic Journal |
| Volume | 113 |
| Issue number | 484 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 2003 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
Cite this
The political economy of inflation, labour market distortions and central bank independence. / Herrendorf, Berthold; Neumann, Manfred J M.
In: Economic Journal, Vol. 113, No. 484, 01.2003, p. 43-64.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - The political economy of inflation, labour market distortions and central bank independence
AU - Herrendorf, Berthold
AU - Neumann, Manfred J M
PY - 2003/1
Y1 - 2003/1
N2 - Using the citizen-candidate model we study the government's choice of institutions for the labour market and the central bank and derive the implications for inflation and employment. We derive conditions for the existence of equilibria in which the labour market is distorted and the central bank is dependent or independent under a range of conditions affecting central bank dependence, the post-election cycle in inflation and employment and inflation bias. Our results imply that average inflation and inflation variability are lower under an independent central bank whereas employment variability can be lower or higher, consistent with evidence for OECD countries.
AB - Using the citizen-candidate model we study the government's choice of institutions for the labour market and the central bank and derive the implications for inflation and employment. We derive conditions for the existence of equilibria in which the labour market is distorted and the central bank is dependent or independent under a range of conditions affecting central bank dependence, the post-election cycle in inflation and employment and inflation bias. Our results imply that average inflation and inflation variability are lower under an independent central bank whereas employment variability can be lower or higher, consistent with evidence for OECD countries.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0037246481&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0037246481&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/1468-0297.00088
DO - 10.1111/1468-0297.00088
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0037246481
VL - 113
SP - 43
EP - 64
JO - Economic Journal
JF - Economic Journal
SN - 0013-0133
IS - 484
ER -