The Performance Effect of Feedback Frequency and Detail

Evidence from a Field Experiment in Customer Satisfaction

Pablo Casas Arce, Sofia M. Lourenço, F. Asís Martínez-Jerez

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper presents the results from a field experiment that examines the effects of nonfinancial performance feedback on the behavior of professionals working for an insurance repair company. We vary the frequency (weekly and monthly) and the level of detail of the feedback that the 800 professionals receive. Contrary to what we would expect if these professionals conformed to the model of the Bayesian decision maker, more (and more frequent) information does not always help improve performance. In fact, we find that professionals achieve the best outcomes when they receive detailed but infrequent (monthly) feedback. The treatment groups with frequent feedback, regardless of how detailed it is, perform no better than the control group (with monthly and aggregate information). The results are consistent with the information in the latest feedback report being most salient and professionals in the weekly treatments overweighting their most recent performance, hampering their ability to learn.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalJournal of Accounting Research
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - 2017

Fingerprint

Customer satisfaction
Field experiment
Decision maker
Insurance
Repair
Performance feedback

Keywords

  • Customer satisfaction
  • Feedback
  • Field experiment
  • Incentives
  • Performance
  • Salience

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

The Performance Effect of Feedback Frequency and Detail : Evidence from a Field Experiment in Customer Satisfaction. / Casas Arce, Pablo; Lourenço, Sofia M.; Martínez-Jerez, F. Asís.

In: Journal of Accounting Research, 2017.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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